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Abstract Drawing on Clare Hemmings’ work on feminist narratives, this 
article explores attitudes to the future in recent German-language pop-feminist 
volumes, including, amongst others, Meredith Haaf, Susanne Klingner and 
Barbara Streidl’s Wir Alpha-Mädchen: Warum Feminismus das Leben schöner 
macht [We Alpha-Girls: Why Feminism Makes Life More Beautiful] (2008) and 
the feminist memoir Neue deutsche Mädchen [New German Girls] (2008) by 
Jana Hensel and Elisabeth Raether. After analysing the rhetoric of linear 
progress deployed in these texts and the ways in which their authors consign 
second-wave feminism to the past in the name of a normative future, I go on to 
examine future-thinking in two complex first-person novels: Helene 
Hegemann’s Axolotl Roadkill (2010) and Antonia Baum’s Vollkommen leblos, 
bestenfalls tot [Completely Lifeless, Preferably Dead] (2011). I demonstrate 
how these novels invoke a sense of disorientation and asynchronous temporality 
that is productively queer. Their disruptions of time and space, of language and 
form, combine with decentred central protagonists to throw doubt on the figure 
of the coherent sovereign subject who lurks persistently behind the new German 
feminists’ configuration of the self-empowered “individual.” Finally, this paper 
contends that the queer refusal of normative futures enacted by the novels 
allows the opportunity to imagine alternative modes of being that are potentially 
politically transformative. 
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n her 2011 monograph Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist 
Theory, Clare Hemmings analyses the narratives recounted by feminists about 
Western feminism’s recent past. She identifies three types of story, each matching the 
ideological viewpoint of its narrator. The “narrative of progress” is linear and future-
oriented; it characterizes second-wave feminism as an essentialist, universalizing 
discourse located firmly in the past, which has been corrected by poststructuralist 
accounts of fluid identity and by theories of intersectionality, so that diverse life 
I 
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experiences and multiple differences between women are now consistently taken into 
account. Hemmings glosses this story of progress in the following manner: 
 
We used to think of “woman” or feminism as a unified category, but through 
the subsequent efforts of black and lesbian feminist theorists […] the field has 
diversified and feminism itself has become the object of detailed critical and 
political scrutiny. Far from being a problem, difference within the category 
“woman,” and within feminisms, should be a cause for celebration […] Since 
“woman” is no longer the ground of feminism […] an intellectual focus on 
gender or feminism alone may indicate an anachronistic attachment to false 
unity or essentialism. (Hemmings 3–4) 
 
The “narrative of loss,” on the other hand, characterizes recent feminist history in 
terms of the perceived undoing of unified political engagement in the face of 
“progressive fragmentation of categories,” whilst the “narrative of return” celebrates 
the long-awaited recuperation of earlier feminist theories after a period of perceived 
postmodern distraction. Those earlier theories – so the narrative goes – might in fact 
still have something to offer despite the “valuable critiques of essentialism” they were 
exposed to (4). 
Hemmings argues that these stories should not be taken at face value and 
should instead be exposed to careful scrutiny, due to the ways in which they “intersect 
with wider institutionalizations of gendered meanings” that depict feminism as 
generally anachronistic and irrelevant (1). Indeed, the narrative of progress, the focus 
of the first section of this article, emerges not only in Anglo-American accounts of 
feminist history but also in European discussions of the recent Western feminist past, 
where feminist texts often endorse, reproduce and augment this logic. 
In this paper, I begin by analysing how a corpus of essayistic feminist texts 
published in Germany around the mid-2000s invokes a narrative of progress, and I go 
on to think through the implications of relying on its logic. The volumes under 
discussion include the pop-theoretical text, Wir Alpha-Mädchen: Warum Feminismus 
das Leben schöner macht [We Alpha-Girls: Why Feminism Makes Life More 
Beautiful] (2008), by Meredith Haaf, Susanne Klingner and Barbara Streidl; the 
essayistic, autobiographical work, Neue deutsche Mädchen [New German Girls] 
(2008), by Jana Hensel and Elisabeth Raether; Mirja Stöcker’s edited work Das F-
Wort: Feminismus ist Sexy [The F-Word: Feminism is Sexy] (2006); and Thea Dorn’s 
Die F-Klasse: Wie die Zukunft von Frauen gemacht wird [The F-Class: How Women 
are Making the Future] (2006). These contemporary texts, which purport to mark a 
new departure in feminism for a generation of young women, tend to legitimize their 
own future-oriented position by (to a greater or lesser degree) disparaging prominent 
second-wave feminists and repudiating second-wave strategies, which they often 
deem to be dogmatic and hopelessly anachronistic. In their place, the new feminisms 
emphasize the importance of individual choice, with the result that the target of the 
new feminism often becomes (their notion of) second-wave feminism itself. 
After analysing the ways in which these new German feminists deploy the 
narrative of progress, I turn to a discussion of two German first-person novels which 
were published around the same time as the feminist volumes and which engage with 
many of the same issues. The novels can be compared fruitfully with the feminist 
texts due to their shared themes, on the one hand, and their contrasting temporal 
schema, on the other. The distinction lies in the disparate approaches to questions of 
futurity in the novels and in the essayistic texts, a divergence generated in part by the 
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novels’ narrative strategies and the use of rhetoric in the feminist volumes. In stark 
contrast to the new feminist texts, the literary narratives under discussion, Helene 
Hegemann’s Axolotl Roadkill (2010) and Antonia Baum’s Vollkommen leblos, 
bestenfalls tot [Completely Lifeless, Preferably Dead] (2011), disrupt notions of linear 
progress and problematize future-facing orientations. 
They also resist the logic of loss or return narratives, by which I mean a sense 
of nostalgia for a more politically progressive time, or hope for its return. I will 
demonstrate how these novels, in fact, invoke a sense of disorientation and 
asynchronous temporality that is productively queer. Their queer disruptions of time 
and space, of language and form, combine with decentred central protagonists to 
throw doubt on the figure of the coherent sovereign subject who lurks persistently 
behind the new German feminists’ configuration of the self-empowered “individual.” 
It is my contention that the queer temporality and disorientation generated by the 
novels in fact allow the opportunity of imagining alternative modes of being which 
are potentially politically transformative. By focusing on the stalled and troubled 
transitions from adolescence to young adulthood of two disruptive female 
protagonists, the novels pose important questions about the political implications of 
subscribing to the available “substantializations of identity,” in Lee Edelman’s terms, 
within contemporary neoliberalism and the notion of “history as a linear narrative […] 
in which meaning succeeds as revealing itself – as itself – through time” (4). By 
refusing to partake in this “narrative movement toward a viable political future” the 
protagonists and their textual vehicles enact a queer resistance to the socio-political 
status quo (ibid.). They also critically illuminate the, in fact, normative trajectories 
invoked by the feminist narratives of progress under discussion. In contrast, the 
novels’ young, disoriented protagonists and the fragmented form of the novels 
themselves embody what Judith Halberstam has called a postmodern rupture in the 
“stability of form and meaning,” which, according to Halberstam, constitutes both a 
“crisis and an opportunity” (In a Queer Time 6). 
Haaf, Klingner and Streidl’s We Alpha-Girls, Hensel and Raether’s New 
German Girls, Stöcker’s The F-Word and Thea Dorn’s The F-Class construct a 
temporal model of recent feminist history arranged to position their work in the 
vanguard of relevant, popular feminist thought. A visual depiction might illustrate this 
strategy in the form of a unidirectional arrow pointing from left to right, where the tip 
of the arrowhead represents both the present and the implied future of feminism. The 
arrow’s point of origin and the base of the arrow shaft connote a homogenized notion 
of 1970s second-wave feminism situated firmly in a discrete and completed past. The 
length of the arrow represents a linear process moving through the 1980s, during 
which time the ground is prepared for 1970s feminism to be overhauled, in the first 
place through the influence of poststructuralism and 1990s Anglo-American feminist 
theorists who explode the category “woman,” and now, finally, by these young writers 
in Germany located at the very tip of the arrowhead. Thematic progress becomes 
artificially mapped on to the temporal model: the arrow functions at different times to 
connote a move from sameness to difference, from anti- to pro-sex, from anti- to pro-
men, from homo- to heterosexual, from proscription to permission, and, finally, from 
victimhood and anger to agency and fun. 
The reinvigoration of published popular feminist discourse arising in the 
2000s with the emergence of these volumes was all the more striking as a result of the 
prolonged dominance of Germany’s equivalent to second-wave feminism in the 
German public sphere. I say “equivalent” as the wave metaphor does not constitute a 
part of feminist terminology in the German-language context. In fact, the post-1968 
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feminist resurgence in Germany, Austria and Switzerland became known as 
Neufeminismus (new feminism), leading me to use the Anglo-American terminology 
“second-wave” here to avoid confusion with the most recent volumes under 
discussion. The absence of the wave metaphor in the German context, however, which 
symbolically links stages in Anglo-American feminist discourse while simultaneously 
distinguishing between them, also contributed to the sense of abrupt caesura upon 
publication of the latest texts. In those recent volumes, the authors employ rhetorical 
strategies and a narrative structure in order to consign the, in their opinion, 
anachronistic tenets of second-wave feminism to the past and situate their own works 
firmly in the present. Techniques employed to achieve this include creating and 
sustaining a lexical dichotomy between “new” and “old” feminisms (they rename the 
(second-wave) “new feminists” “old feminists” and appropriate the moniker “new” 
for themselves), the use of comparative syntactical structures, the reconfiguration of 
the word “feminism” (it becomes the F-Word, the F-Class, and feminists become 
Alpha-Girls or New German Girls) and the employment of a linear structure within 
the physical texts, which invariably includes a simplistic account of 1970s and 1980s 
Western feminism, from which their “new” feminism emerges as a seemingly 
inevitable development. 
The second-wave feminists in Germany become proponents, therefore, of an 
anachronistic “Altfeminismus” (old feminism), which is frequently conflated with the 
person of the prominent feminist journalist and media figurehead Alice Schwarzer, a 
strategy which tends to homogenize an in fact rich and varied period of German-
language feminist history. The new feminists, on the other hand, align themselves in 
their volumes linguistically with the here and now, and “die Probleme junger Frauen 
von heute” (the problems of young women today) (Haaf, Klingner, and Streidl 14). 
And, in the case of the title to Thea Dorn’s volume (The F-Class: How Women are 
Making the Future), the present stretches into a future already being constructed by 
women – and that future reaches back into and inflects the present. The Alpha-Girls 
justify their work by claiming that the “old feminism” has lost its relevance for young 
women, proposing, “dass der Feminismus einfach nur mal auf den neuesten Stand 
gebracht werden muss” (feminism has just got to be brought up to date) (Haaf, 
Klingner, and Streidl 14). Their volume, they claim, marks the beginning of this 
process of making a new feminist future (ibid.). 
New German Girls Jana Hensel and Elisabeth Raether also focus on Alice 
Schwarzer as the embodiment of “old feminism.” Despite dedicating a large amount 
of print to her, they assert that Schwarzer’s generation – implying the second wave – 
has become anachronistic. In unequivocal language, the New German Girls place 
Schwarzer firmly in the past: “mehr als das, was sie bis jetzt erreicht hat, wird diese 
[Schwarzer’s] Generation nicht erreichen. Die Zeit hat sie eingeholt, ihre Rhetorik ist 
oll, Alice Schwarzer und ihre Frauen sind Historie geworden“ (this generation won’t 
achieve any more than what they’ve already achieved. Time’s caught up with them, 
their rhetoric is old-hat. Alice Schwarzer and her women are history) (Hensel and 
Raether 14) The non-standard term “oll” in German functions something like the 
English “of yore,” in order to “other” the second wave linguistically. Following 
Hemmings, their generational logic constructs others, in this case Alice Schwarzer 
and her “women,” as “less invested in feminism by privileging time over context” 
(Hemmings 150). In this excerpt, what matters is that time has caught up with them, 
rather than the matter of contextually based distinctions. 
The Alpha-Girls deploy their own rhetorical figures strategically and, in the 
process, oversimplify feminism’s recent past. This ensures that the new feminism may 
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be viewed favourably by comparison. For example, one of the opening chapters 
concludes with the following anaphoric call and response: 
 
Der alte Feminismus hat keine Lösung für das Dilemma “Beruf oder Familie”? 
Dann muss der neue Feminismus eine finden! Der alte Feminismus will die 
Frauen stärken, indem er die Männer ausschließt? Dann muss ein neuer 
Feminismus den Männern erklären, warum es auch für sie super ist, wenn wir 
uns weiterentwickeln. 
 
(So the old feminism has no solution for the dilemma “career or family”? Then 
the new feminism has to find one! So the old feminism wants to empower 
women by shutting out men? Then the new feminism has to explain to men 
how our further development is also great for them!) (Haaf, Klingner, and 
Streidl 14–15) 
 
Thematically, the progress narrative in these texts configures second-wave feminism 
as a movement based around the notion of “woman” as a unified category; the 
universalizing tendency of 1970s feminists, they claim, resulted in hierarchies and 
exclusions which led to internal conflicts and schisms. In We Alpha-Girls, the 1970s 
and 1980s connote almost exclusively a time of “Grabenkämpfe und Rechthaberei” 
(sectarianism and self-righteousness) (194), during which the women’s movement 
disintegrated in the face of conflicts between heterosexual and lesbian feminists, pro- 
and anti-sex feminists and pro- and anti-pornography feminists (194–96). The Alpha-
Girls fall back on the generalization that this infighting and feminism’s consequential 
downfall resulted from certain second-wave feminists’ “Kontrollzwang und 
ideologischer Totalanspruch” (control issues and exhaustive ideological demands) 
(195). Their central target for accusations of such tendencies in Germany is, once 
again, Schwarzer, who is accused of proselytizing, condescension and of disparaging 
women who have contrasting ideas or lifestyles. As a direct textual contrast, their 
subsequent chapter is entitled “Und Jetzt?” [And Now?], and begins with an 
aspirational reference to 1990s American third-wave feminism, with its more 
permissive attitude towards sex, sexuality and pop-cultural playfulness. 
In order to construct a persuasive and comprehensively relevant progress 
narrative, the Alpha-Girls must perform an anti-universalizing gesture in order to 
signal a move from the universalist identity politics they associate with Schwarzer to a 
poststructurally inflected politics of difference and intersectionality that they associate 
with American third-wave feminism. Yet in their introduction the Alpha-Girls admit 
that some readers “werden vielleicht die spezifischen Perspektiven lesbischer Frauen 
oder etwa Migrantinnen vermissen” (will perhaps miss the particular perspectives of 
lesbian or migrant women) (8), for these are not included in their allegedly all-
inclusive feminism. This is why the Alpha-Girls offer the disclaimer that their book 
does not intend to unite all viewpoints because they are aware that not all women in 
Germany live their lives in the same way (ibid.). This disclaimer has a useful if 
pernicious rhetorical function: a professed understanding of difference and 
intersectionality as progressive turns in Western feminism relieves the narrators of the 
burden of engaging fully with their details or their implications within their texts. 
The Alpha-Girls also stress the importance of the theoretical insights provided 
by “die Genderforschung” (gender studies) for their own work (30). These include an 
awareness of the importance of differentiating between “biologischem und sozialen 
Geschlecht sowie zwischen Geschlecht und Geschlechtsidentität” (biological and 
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social sex, as well as between gender and gender identity) (ibid.). Referring to 
“gender studies” functions as shorthand for describing the intervention of 
poststructuralist, queer, and postcolonial feminist critiques, which are portrayed as 
interrupting the self-absorbed universalism and essentialism of the second wave. In 
her work, which does not draw on German feminism, Clare Hemmings notes that 
Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble (1990), in particular, functions as a threshold text in 
anglophone feminist texts, in particular, providing the same kind of shorthand for this 
shift as does the choice of naming gender studies rather than women’s studies. These 
strategies are also visible in the new feminist German texts under discussion. For 
example, in her contribution to the multi-authored volume Das F-Wort: Feminismus 
ist sexy, Jenny Warnecke credits Butler with the single-handed dismantling of the 
category “woman,” indeed of the subject itself. Warnecke locates the origins of 
twenty-first-century feminist thinking in Butler’s account of the incoherent subject 
and glosses the latter’s impact: 
 
Mitten hinein in dieses Wir-Gefühl hat Judith Butler die Frau als 
Handlungssubjekt in Frage gestellt und philosophisch kurzerhand aufgelöst, 
stattdessen hat sie Bündnispolitik und Netzwerke empfohlen. Aktionen 
nehmen ihren Ausgangspunkt in einem gemeinsamen Problem und nicht in 
einer vermeintlichen Geschlechtsidentität. 
 
(Judith Butler interrupted this sense of a feminist “we” by scrutinizing the 
acting subject category “woman” and, without further ado, philosophically 
dismantling it. In its place, she proposed a politics predicated on alliances and 
networks. Action originates in mutual problems and not in an alleged gender 
identity.) (Warnecke 36) 
 
At another point, Warnecke claims that “[d]ie Frau im Plural gibt es nicht mehr. Das 
ist seit Judith Butlers Buch Gender Trouble klar” (woman in the plural doesn’t exist 
anymore. That’s been clear ever since Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble) (25).1 Butler’s 
deployment as a textual grenade in the new German texts achieves several complex 
goals at once. Firstly, Butler constitutes a shorthand for the seismic shift in feminist 
theory which the young authors claim as their inheritance. Secondly, it distances these 
authors from their second-wave feminist forebears theoretically (difference over 
universalism) and spatially (US over German influence); the mention of Judith Butler, 
along with other aspects of Anglo-American and French theory, signals a turn away 
from a domestic tradition of feminist thought. Thirdly, it provides the appearance of a 
dalliance with queer theory without actually requiring full engagement with its finer 
details. This is because these volumes are generally entirely heteronormative and 
draw on Butler almost exclusively for her insights into sex and gender as social 
constructs and the deconstruction of the category “woman,” as the above passage 
demonstrates. 
The progress narrative as it appears in the German texts is problematic for 
several reasons. Firstly, it reduces complex historical developments to oversimplified 
summaries. Secondly, as Hemmings has noted, it “coincide[s] unnervingly with those 
[narratives] that place Western feminism firmly in the past in order to ‘neutralize’ 
gender equality in its global circuits” (11). The intention to reinvigorate feminist 
discourse in the face of malignant mainstream representations of feminism that 
consign second-wave feminism to history requires the construction of a linear 
narrative of progress distancing the new feminists – and their intended audience – 
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from the perceived negativity of “Altfeminismus” (old feminism). This strategy 
ultimately results in an all-pervasive textual preoccupation with the process of 
disentanglement from the past, to the extent that feminism itself appears to become 
the sole object of critique. The new feminisms thus collude with post- and anti-
feminist narratives which themselves place feminism in the past, and reinscribe 
precisely those malignant popular representations of second-wave feminism. 
“Altfeminismus” becomes the problem instead of the social constellations which gave 
rise to feminist intervention in the first place. Thirdly, the texts’ vision of the future is 
somewhat ephemeral, as almost every thorny issue is dealt with by insisting that 
women must make their own individual choice. 
As a result, concrete strategies for specific issues are lacking, as are 
suggestions for the interventions that the community of Alpha-Girls could make. The 
notion of a better future for women is rhetorically invoked but ultimately appears to 
be confined within the paradigm of the neoliberal status quo. In the place of a 
coherent political agenda for the future, the Alpha-Girls in fact appear to propose a 
withdrawal from radical feminist politics to that which Jana Hensel calls “normality.” 
She observes that “in den letzten Jahren wurde immer deutlicher: Längst ist es die 
Normalität, die zu unserer größten Sehnsucht geworden ist“ (in the last few years it’s 
become increasingly apparent that what we really desire is normality) (Hensel and 
Raether 15). This brand of feminism thus aligns itself with normative mainstream 
culture and circumvents the radicalism – and the concomitant exposure to censure – 
linked with Schwarzer’s generation. The Alpha-Girls have been exposed to, and in 
turn impose, what in Michel Foucault’s terms might be called the disciplinary function 
of patriarchal institutions enacted by the power of the norm (Foucault 92–108; Caputo 
and Yount 6). Normalization monitors and disciplines those who stray beyond the 
limits of the norm, which, as Hensel’s comment implies, makes the norm an object of 
aspiration. 
I move now to an analysis of futurity in Helene Hegemann’s Axolotl Roadkill 
and Antonia Baum’s Vollkommen leblos, bestenfalls tot. Both debut novels, they 
present the reader with two young female protagonists, Mifti and Rosa, whose 
aggressive self-awareness, acerbic commentaries and ironic attitudes place both 
themselves and the reader at one remove from their otherwise palpable existential 
distress. Baum and Hegemann disturb representation at the formal level. Their 
complex, self-reflexive novels question the terms in which the experience of 
consciousness is represented and examine the possibility of coherent subjectivity, 
eschewing mimetic representation and disturbing linearity. Emily Jeremiah has noted 
that the dramatic circumstances surrounding the publication of Hegemann’s debut, 
when the author was seventeen, produced a particularly “instructive controversy,” 
which revealed a “great deal about contemporary German literary and cultural ideals, 
especially as far as girls and young women are concerned” (Jeremiah 400). 
(Hegemann was at first embraced as a “Wunderkind,” then, as the extent and variety 
of her intertextual approach became known, was publicly derided by the male literary 
establishment as derivative and/or deceitful.) 
Nevertheless, the authors distance their protagonists from the feminist grand 
récit as a solution to crises in female subjectivity and agency. Instead, the novels 
hurtle towards their protagonists’ seemingly inevitable psychological and physical 
breakdown, offering them no system of belief or ideology on which to gain a 
purchase. Thus, Baum and Hegemann express ambivalence towards feminism – an 
ambivalence that Hegemann herself publicly identifies with –even while they draw in 
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The relentless inner monologue from which Vollkommen leblos, bestenfalls tot 
is constructed captures the complex thought processes of its psychologically unstable 
protagonist, Rosa Sperrlich. Scattered amongst the many fantastical sequences that 
could be dreams or hallucinations, there are conversations, at times in e-mail or text 
message form. Baum’s protagonist moves to the city after her final school exams. She 
looks forward to escaping the toxic influence of her family, but instead she finds a 
controlling boyfriend, a tedious job in new media, and drug and alcohol excess. 
Thwarted in her attempts to find a foothold on her life, she rails against what she calls 
the “Werde-Pflicht” (compulsory-becoming) (Baum 237) of her generation. After two 
damaging relationships, Rosa becomes pregnant but aborts. She withdraws into a 
cocoon of lethargy, first starving herself then beginning to cut herself. The novel’s 
conclusion finds her about to commit suicide by jumping from a tall building, and 
ends with a moment of insight on Rosa’s part into her parents’ messy lives and past 
mistakes. In the first edition (Hoffmann and Campe, 2011), the last line is the 
postscript “Rosa Sperrlich, Marcialla im Sommer 2011,” which suggests that the 
novel is, in fact, the narrative that Rosa attempts to write during the period of her 
illness completed at a later date in Italy. The 2013 Suhrkamp edition omits this 
postscript, effectively sustaining the gesture of refusal to think the future enacted by 
the novel as a whole. 
In Axolotl Roadkill the streams of consciousness are interspersed with 
flashbacks to the protagonist, Mifti’s, troubled childhood. As in Baum’s novel, it 
becomes clear that the novel we are reading is Mifti’s diary. Meanwhile, Mifti takes 
drugs, has sex, steals money from her father, goes to parties in Berlin and yearns after 
her older ex-girlfriend, Alice. When her family finally expresses concern about her 
behaviour, Mifti allows herself to get caught whilst shoplifting in order to force an 
encounter with Alice. The novel ends with a hallucinatory reunion of sorts between 
the lovers and a replication of a hate-filled letter of maternal rejection signed in the 
name of Mifti’s mother. 
It may seem counterintuitive to select two novels for comparison which appear 
to withdraw from feminist engagement, indeed from the viability of socio-cultural 
critique per se, moving, as they do, between critical ambivalence and ironic 
observation. At one and the same time, the novels both express and thwart the 
yearning for an alternative mode of being, countering the contemplation of a better 
future with cynical posturing, self-harm, and the rejection of the future in the form of 
adulthood. But this rejection, or refusal, can be understood to constitute a productive 
queer intervention by offering an alternative to compulsory future-oriented positivity 
of the type displayed by the new feminists, which is based on a binary mode of 
thinking that privileges linear time over context. As Halberstam notes, “[w]hile liberal 
histories build triumphant political narratives with progressive stories of improvement 
and success, radical histories must contend with a less tidy past, one that passes on 
legacies of failure and loneliness” (In a Queer Time 98). 
Both characters must contend with “untidy” pasts in the form of their 
experience of traumatic childhood events: Mifti was physically and psychologically 
abused by her mother, who died two years before the novel begins, and she lives with 
her siblings, away from her emotionally distant father. Rosa grew up with a 
depressed, alcoholic mother, whose unhappy marriage led her to leave her husband 
and child in order to return to her studies, which she had broken off when pregnant 
with Rosa. Both characters’ families are materially wealthy, but dysfunctional. Rosa 
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describes her family as “ein asozialer Familienrest mit Geld” (the anti-social remnants 
of a family with money) (Baum 7). In fact, families connote for them the most 
dangerous thing in the world (see, for example, ibid. 17), engendering a fear of 
adulthood, which expresses itself in Mifti’s desire never to grow up (Hegemann 15) 
and in Rosa’s rejection of what she calls the “Zukunfts-Krankheit” (the scourge of the 
prospective) (Baum 13). 
The fear of growing up can be understood as part of the protagonists’ 
awareness of the normative trajectories they have been and will be exposed to. Rosa’s 
initial celibacy and, later, her anorexia can be seen as attempts to return to a less 
complex state of being in the form of prepubescence, and the only wish that Mifti 
expresses explicitly (and arguably without irony) is “nicht erwachsen werden” (not to 
grow up) (Hegemann 15), a desire which explains her sense of kinship with the 
axolotl of the title. This type of salamander, renowned for its regenerative qualities, 
reaches adulthood without metamorphosis, entailing that it remains – in human terms 
– prepubescent. Like the axolotl, both Mifti and Rosa appear to be suspended in stasis, 
stuck in a present determined by the past and unable to find any productive way of 
moving into the future: they spend hours sleeping, drifting in and out of consciousness 
or seeking escape in drug-induced altered states of consciousness. As Mifti writes: 
“ich traue mich nicht, an morgen zu denken, ich traue mich eigentlich überhaupt 
nicht, zu denken” (I don’t trust myself to think about tomorrow. I don’t even trust 
myself to think at all) (135). 
The novels’ narrative structure reflects the characters’ sense of stasis, of 
refusing, or being unable, to move on; it also functions to render textually the 
overwhelming simultaneity of consciousness, i.e., the debilitating presence of the past 
and the (fear of the) future in the present. Thus, the linearity of traditional narrative 
form is perpetually disrupted, impeding forward propulsion, and disorientating the 
reader, who becomes as wrong-footed as the protagonists themselves. As Jeremiah 
notes: 
 
The disorienting effect of Hegemann’s own novel can be seen as queerly 
instructive. The novel’s failure to offer orientation, or to orient itself according 
to literary conventions, provokes a consideration of what those norms actually 
constitute, just as Mifti’s failure to ﬁt in prompts a challenge to the very idea 
of ﬁtting in. (Jeremiah 404) 
 
Axolotl Roadkill is constructed from a patchwork of non sequiturs and provocatively 
self-contradictory statements; indeed, Mifti’s brother suggests at one point that her 
writing (in the form of her diary) resembles roadkill. It is also often difficult to 
distinguish between past and present events and real or imagined scenes. In 
Vollkommen leblos, Rosa’s inner monologue is relentless and repetitive. This evokes 
the cyclical nature of Rosa’s jammed thought patterns. Sentences spread over pages, 
pinned down by an “I think” at each end, whilst her thoughts range across time, and 
space, and her narrated movements are punctuated by events, often sudden and 
violent, which are never identified as real or imagined. 
When the reader first encounters Rosa, she is criticizing her teachers’ 
“Zukunfts-Besessenheit” (obsession with the future) (Baum 13), which she feels 
focuses only on the conventional markers of neoliberal success: wealth, career, and 
heteronormative nuclear family. She observes: 
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In den Klassenzimmern haben sie uns jahrelang terrorisiert mit ihren 
Einschüchterungs-Parolen über die Zukunft und über Berufe mit bzw. ohne 
Zukunft und wenig Zeit, das haben sie immer wieder gesagt, dass wir keine 
Zeit haben und uns beeilen müssen. 
 
(In the classrooms they terrorized us for years with their threatening speeches 
about the future and about careers with – and careers without – a future and so 
little time, that’s what they said over and over again, that we had no time and 
had to hurry up.) (12) 
 
This pressure can be understood in terms of the narrative of neoliberal self-
optimization which, as I have argued elsewhere, exposes young women to relentless 
pressure to aspire and succeed (Spiers, “Long March”; “‘Mädchen’”). Alongside 
school, the protagonists’ families constitute another source of this pressure. As a 
result, the unhappy and dysfunctional biographies of the parental generation in 
Baum’s and Hegemann’s novels function as a mode of queer critique of the 
heteronormative nuclear family, which aligns with the characters’ initial avowals that 
they will not cooperate with the imperative to procreate. 
Rosa rails against what she calls “nationalsozialistisch[e] Popkultur” (national-
socialist pop-culture) (Baum 207), a homogeneous postmodern culture, in which 
identity has become a lifestyle commodity, the pivotal consumer product concept 
driving neoliberal economics, or as Rosa puts it “I.C.H. inc.” (M.E. Inc.) (104). Rosa 
satirizes a culture in which individual self-responsibility has become the dominant 
narrative and citizens exist in solitary units, protecting themselves from 
intersubjective encounters with headphones (206). The consequence of freedom of 
individual choice and self-empowerment is that “[l]etzlich ist jeder für sich selbst 
verantwortlich” (ultimately everybody is responsible for themselves) (62), a line 
which echoes the Alpha-Girl rhetoric discussed above. Such a climate has no patience 
for those who are relentlessly exposed, buffeted and subsumed by the weight of social 
expectations. Instead, Rosa and Mifti are each reminded constantly: “Du sollst das 
einfach durchziehen” (you’ve just got to see it through) (Hegemann 77), an imperative 
they push against. 
At the beginning of Vollkommen leblos, Rosa views her imminent move to the 
city as an opportunity to shape her own life: “Man kann alles machen. Ich will was 
werden” (Anything is possible. I want to become something) (Baum 16). However, 
once in the city, Rosa experiences difficulty in establishing relationships, theorizing 
that, due to her traumatic childhood, something has been “ripped out” of her and 
never replaced (42). Like Mifti, she begins to perceive herself as fatally determined, a 
product of social construction which prevents her from truly autonomous action. 
These reflective passages constitute the interrogatory dimension inherent in these 
works of fiction, which remains lacking in the pop-feminist non-fiction. For example, 
in her relationship with her boyfriend Patrick she feels unable to be anything but 
“ferngesteuert” (remote-controlled) (Baum 30), a victim of the “seit Jahrhunderten 
überlieferten Schlamm” (legacy of centuries’-old sludge) of social convention and 
fixed gender roles (37). Convention and passive constructions of femininity clash with 
more recent postfeminist propaganda that demands that women become “total befreit. 
Sei weiblich und sei dabei wie ein Mann. Sei auch sexuell befreit […] lass’ dich krass 
überall rein ficken und wirke dabei möglichst selbstbewusst” (totally liberated. Be 
feminine and, at the same time, be like a man. Be sexually liberated, too […] let 
yourself be fucked like crazy in every conceivable hole, but make sure you look as 
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self-confident as you can while you do) (ibid.). This passage aligns strikingly with my 
critique of Alpha-Girl pop-feminism, which often foregrounds confident sexuality as 
one of the only viable sites of agency. 
Having attempted and failed to gain a purchase on life Rosa becomes 
pregnant. After taking her mother’s advice to abort, Rosa realizes she has undertaken 
that which her mother wishes she had done when she was pregnant with Rosa, 
increasing Rosa’s sense of being socially alienated. She isolates herself still further, 
experiencing herself as trapped in a “Kopfgefängnis” (head prison) (233), eventually 
developing an eating disorder. Rosa describes her illness as a “Leistungssport” 
(competitive sport), satirically inverting the social demands placed upon her to 
succeed (209). Success in this case constitutes the complete destruction of self. 
Rosa even views her disorder with ironic detachment: “Ich fand es nicht sehr 
originell essgestört zu werden, das störte mich tatsächlich, aber man braucht irgendein 
Geländer, irgendetwas was einem sagt, was man ist” (I didn’t find it very original to 
develop a disturbed eating disorder. In fact, that really disturbed me. But you need 
some kind of handhold, something that tells you what you are) (ibid.). When her 
subsequent attempt to find this point of purchase at university fails, viewing the 
education offered there as an extension of her intellectual cage, Rosa begins to “open 
herself up” in other ways (232). She cuts herself because “[r]ot zeigt dir an, wo du im 
Raum stehst, Rot zeigt dir, dass du dich nicht irrst, Rot macht dich sichtbar, Rot 
schafft Ordnung, Einheit, Unterschied, ein Oben, ein Unten, einen Anfang und ein 
Ende” (red shows you where you are in space, red shows you that you’re not 
mistaken, red makes you visible, red creates order, coherence, difference, an above, a 
below, a beginning and an end) (ibid.). 
These passages are striking for their representation of Rosa’s grappling with 
her sense of being socially determined not just in temporal but also in spatial terms. 
Stuck in the “prison” of her brain, Rosa rejects the imperative to pull herself together 
and in fact pursues an alternative path of self-orientation. Following Sara Ahmed, 
what Rosa has uncovered are the invisible lines of orientation that have determined 
the path her life would take. As Ahmed notes, “[w]e follow the line that is followed 
by others: the repetition of the act of following makes the line disappear from view as 
the point from which ‘we’ emerge” (21). Rosa’s process of enquiry into the normative 
processes of orientation involves exploring alternative models of orientation. These 
include the eating disorder, which functions as one kind of “handhold,” “something 
that tells you what you are,” or indeed orientates you. Cutting, too, becomes described 
in spatial terms that imply the processes of orientation: the red blood becomes the 
“line” that “shows you where you are in space.” Rosa’s non-normative spatial 
orientation makes visible the usually invisible normative lines and orientations 
directing individuals’ progression through life by her very deviation from the path. 
Yet as Ahmed notes, “risking departure from the straight and narrow makes new 
futures possible, which might involve going astray [or] getting lost” (ibid.). 
The novels, however, do not seek to portray this refusal to toe the line as 
necessarily liberating or pleasurable. The disorientation experienced by the 
protagonists, which becomes the reader’s disorientation, is painful and, as Emily 
Jeremiah notes, frightening (405). Mifti and Rosa withdraw from a social world they 
view as culturally and politically bankrupt, seeking even to escape the body and the 
psyche, which proves impossible. They are portrayed as symbolically fragmented 
individuals, experiencing themselves as alienated from their own bodies and 
disconnected from any sense of personal agency. Mifti often dreams of her mutilated 
body, where only “[d]as Gesicht ist übrig geblieben, ein paar Fetzen an den 
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Fingerknöcheln auch. Hände und Füße baumeln, weil sie im Gelenk getrennt wurden” 
(my face is left, also a few shreds hanging off my knuckles. Hands and feet are 
flopping around because they’ve been severed at the joint) (Hegemann 40). Mirrors, 
which feature heavily in Axolotl Roadkill, function as a tool for Mifti’s attempts to 
overcome the association of her body with abuse and weakness: 
 
Nur noch die grenzenlose Schwäche ist sichtbar und diese daraus entstandene 
Unschuld. Ohne den Blick von mir selbst abzuwenden, versuche ich mir in 
Erinnerung zu rufen, dass die Haut oberhalb meine Kniekehle, das 
Narbengewebe zwischen den Schultern und das Sommersprossenfeld auf 
meinem Oberschenkel zu mir gehören. 
 
(I can only see limitless weakness and the innocence it generated. Without 
taking my eyes off my reflection I try to call to mind that the skin above the 
back of my knee, the scar tissue between my shoulders and the sprinkle of 
freckles on my thigh belong to me.) (110) 
 
Her body has become a cipher for those abstract qualities of weakness, but also 
innocence, a vehicle onto which can be projected intolerable experience. As long as 
the body remains something “[d]er eigentlich nichts mit dir zu tun hat” (which has 
nothing to do with you) (96), that is, remains disconnected from consciousness per se, 
Mifti is able to retain a sense of at least mental resilience: “weil mein Körper im 
Gegensatz zu mir selbst ein auf körperliche Schmerzen reagierendes Reflexbündel ist” 
(because in contrast to my self, my body is just a bundle of reflexes reacting to 
physical pain) (84). 
But Mifti despises the way in which her body continues to experience 
sensations despite being “disconnected” from her consciousness. For example, she 
becomes disgusted with her body’s ability to experience orgasm during sex with a 
stranger despite the sensation that her consciousness remains disconnected from the 
event (113). The world of sex, which becomes connected with corporeality and abuse, 
entails the loss of language (ibid.), a capacity Mifti at times appears to align with her 
“self.” While this sense of self is fragmented, it is divided rigidly into binaries: the 
body is associated with victimhood, and language at first appears to equate with 
consciousness or “self.” For example, after being attacked by her sister, Mifti 
observes that “[s]elbst das Schreien hat nichts mit mir selbst zu tun, sondern mit der 
unvermittelten Reaktion eines Organismus auf einen bestimmten Reiz. Ich bin nicht 
meine Schreie, ich bin nicht mein physisches Schmerzempfinden, ich bin kein Tier” 
(even the screaming has nothing to do with my self, only with an organism’s sudden 
response to a certain stimulus. I am not my screams. I am not my physical experience 
of pain. I am not an animal) (84). Yet, with a gesture that aligns with a Lacanian 
perspective, Mifti ultimately resists the equation of language with consciousness, or 
self. Acknowledging that even the language she uses is a result of her socialization, 
she asserts that “[m]ir wurde eine Sprache einverleibt, die nicht meine eigene ist” 
(I’ve assimilated a language that is not my own) (47).3 
Mifti’s sense of alienation from the world, her body, and her language does 
not result in resignation but in fact a stubborn refusal to participate in life as it has 
been offered to her. She claims, furthermore: 
 
Ich wollte aufhören zu denken, weil Wörter bedeutungslos waren, weil 
Bedeutungslosigkeit bedeutungslos war, weil das Leben nichts wert war, weil 
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meine komplette Physiognomie Teil des in sich stimmigen Organismus eines 
belebten Himmelskörper ist, von dem ICH mich abgrenze. 
 
(I wanted to stop thinking because words were meaningless, because 
meaninglessness was meaningless, because life was worth nothing, because 
my entire physiognomy is part of the inherently consistent organism of a 
populated celestial body from which I distance myself.) (166) 
 
This refusal of body–mind and self–social integration is part of the novel’s broader 
emphasis on the fragmented and disorientating nature of subjective consciousness. 
But it also connotes a radical act of refusal in the face of the normative options 
available to a young woman like Mifti. Turning again to Halberstam, Mifti’s “refusal 
of self” can be understood as “an anti-liberal act, a revolutionary statement of pure 
opposition that does not rely upon the liberal gesture of defiance but accesses another 
lexicon of power and speaks another language of refusal” (Queer Art 139). 
As both texts move towards crisis, not progress, and their conclusions deny the 
conventional happy ending, they enact a subversion of the Bildungsroman, or the 
“Coming of Age Dramolette,” as Mifti puts it (Hegemann 199). Indeed, they subvert 
the narrative of progress that I have argued defines the essayistic feminist texts 
discussed above. On the one hand, the new feminist texts appear at first glance to 
offer a liberating narrative of progress: from a politics of “freedom from” to one of 
“freedom to.”4 However, their focus on rescuing feminism from what are anyway 
fallacious representations of second-wave feminism and their empty rhetoric, which 
conjures the smooth transcendence of social contingency and bright futures, 
undermines their own agenda. 
But is the radical refusal of the future performed by the novels preferable to 
the naïve, unreflecting optimism of the essayistic texts? Does the bleakness of the 
future, or refusal to imagine one, “access another lexicon of power”? And what might 
that look like? In the novels under discussion, the answer to these questions perhaps 
lies with their emphasis on the generative act of writing, and on the capacity of 
narrative to hold a fragmenting subject within constantly shifting imaginary 
paradigms. For the ability to make and re-make the self with narrative is what finally 
allows the characters in the novels to test their capacity for generative action. As an 
alternative to cutting, Rosa attempts to write down her experiences in order to find the 
structure and coherence she desires. This is perhaps why she states: “Erst versuchen 
wir was Ganzes, eine Erzählung” (First, let’s try something whole: a story) (Baum 
234). For Rosa, a story represents something necessarily coherent due to the 
conventions of narrative structure and the telos propelling it. However, the procedure 
initially produces only distress: 
 
Denke ich, fällt mir sofort das Gegenteil dazu ein, denke ich, sehe ich immer 
die eine und die andere Seite, gibt es niemals etwas ganzes, gültiges […] Aber 
so denkt man heute, dachte ich, als sich Alles in mir zerlegte, alles falsch war 
und nichts stimmte. Unverschämt, anmaßend, überheblich fand ich es von mir 
zu denken, es könne überhaupt einen ganzen Satz oder gar eine ganze 
Geschichte geben. 
 
(I think and then the opposite thought occurs to me immediately, I think and I 
always see both sides, there’s never anything whole and valid […] But that’s 
how people think today, I thought, as everything in me fragmented, everything 
futurity in new german writing 
was wrong and nothing added up. I found it shameless, presumptuous, 
arrogant of me to think that there could ever be a whole sentence let alone a 
whole story.) (235) 
 
Although Rosa claims towards the novel’s conclusion that she never succeeded in 
writing (235–36), the inscription included in the first edition of the novel suggests that 
writing did in fact present one reason for her stepping back from the edge of the 
building she is about to jump off when the novel ends. Suhrkamp’s editorial decision 
to remove the inscription, however, undermines that reading and prolongs the sense of 
radical refusal sustained throughout the text. 
For Mifti, writing does provide a sense of coherence where it is subjectively 
lacking and represents an externalized connection of sorts. It becomes clear that the 
novel the reader is reading “is” Mifti’s diary, which she views as “die 
Ausdruckswaffe gegen meine Angst” (the weapon of expression against my fear) 
(Hegemann 38) and as an attempt to make whole and long-lasting – even temporarily 
– that which might otherwise disappear (67). 
It is worthwhile recalling here the arguments made by Lois McNay and 
Adriana Cavarero concerning the role played by the narrative medium in the “active 
process of configuration whereby individuals attempt to make sense of the temporality 
of existence” (McNay 27). Through their explorations of two characters struggling 
against the effects of social circumstance and psychological damage, Hegemann and 
Baum foreground the “retentive dimension of the sedimented effects of power on the 
body” (McNay 4–5). Yet the authors also develop a generative logic which imagines a 
more creative and imaginative stratum to action. As McNay contends, it is “crucial to 
conceptualize these creative or productive aspects immanent to agency in order to 
explain how, when faced with complexity and difference, individuals may respond in 
unanticipated and innovative ways which may hinder, reinforce or catalyse social 
change” (5). In this case, the narrative impulse experienced by Mifti and Rosa can be 
understood as what Cavarero calls the subject’s desire for unity of the self in the form 
of a story. The subjects who emerge coincide with the “uncontrollable narrative 
impulse of memory” that produces the story the reader has before her, and are also 
“captured in the very text itself” (Cavarero 35). 
For this reason, the novels appear to possess a self-awareness lacking in the 
essayistic texts; in short, they understand their own fictitious nature, and, 
consequently, the role of narrative in identity construction. Whilst the essayistic 
feminist works also construct a narrative, a fiction of recent feminist history to create 
their own identity and to serve their agenda, they do not acknowledge the constructed 
nature of their own story, but offer it up as the “truth.” In the final analysis, however, 
linear narratives of progress and “truth” are unable to fully express – as the novels 
attempt to – the simultaneous temporality of consciousness, where agency may stem 
from a reconciliation of past and future in the present, and not from linear narratives 











1 It is troubling that the new feminists all focus on Butler and not on any feminists of 
colour, such as Kimberlé Crenshaw or bell hooks, who intervened in debates 
concerning the universal female subject before Butler. 
 
2 Helene Hegemann has publicly distanced herself from feminist debate, claiming: 
“[i]ch habe mich mit so etwas nie beschäftigt, weil ich in einer Generation – naja, 
verankert bin ich eigentlich in keiner Generation – aber in einem Jahrzehnt groß 
geworden bin, in dem sich Fragen nach Geschlechterrollen kaum mehr stellten” (I’ve 
never really thought about stuff like that because I’m of a generation – well, actually, 
I’m not really rooted in any generation – but I grew up in a decade when questions 
about gender roles were no longer relevant). Nevertheless, she acknowledges that 
members of the literary industry “sind mit anderen Standards sozialisiert worden, da 
wird mir dann ab und zu dieses Biologie-Intuitions-Monster-Ding angehängt und jede 
Form von Rationalität aberkannt, mit der ich an meine Arbeit herangehe” (were 
socialized with different standards and so occasionally I get lumbered with this 
biology-intuition-monster-thing and denied the rationality with which I go about my 
work). Furthermore, she is able to identify continuing gender bias inherent in literary 
institutions, acknowledging: “Trotzdem, wenn Hamlet auf die Bühne kommt, vertritt 
der ein Menschheitsproblem, und wenn Medea auf die Bühne kommt, ist sie eine 
Frau, die schwerstneurotisch ist” (Nevertheless, when Hamlet comes on stage he 
embodies the human condition, whereas when Medea comes on stage, she’s a crazy 
neurotic woman). She nevertheless refuses to be drawn on the issue, claiming: “ich 
rede da total ungern drüber, weil ich denke, je mehr darüber gesprochen wird, desto 
mehr bestätigt es einen darin, sich weiter in solchen Mustern wohlzufühlen” (I don’t 
like talking about it because I think the more it gets talked about, the more you feel 
justified in staying in those kinds of roles). See Hegemann in Cosima Lutz, “Helene 
Hegemann beraubt ihre Freunde schonungslos,” Welt Online 10 Feb. 2010, available 
<http://www.welt.de/News/article6329626/Helene-Hegemann-beraubt-ihre-Freunde-
schonungslos.html> (accessed 5 Sept. 2016). 
 
3 This statement can also be read, of course, as an ironic authorial aside regarding 
Hegemann’s intertextual strategies. 
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